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PROPER OBSERVANCE OF THE NEW CAPITAL
MURDER TRIAL PROCEDURES DOES NOT
NECESSARILY GUARANTEE DEFENDANT HIS
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
Bell v. State, 360 So. 2d 1206 (Miss. 1978).
On the night of June 21, 1976, Charles S. Bell and three com-
panions stopped at an Amoco service station in Hattiesburg, Missis-
sippi, to purchase gas. After making their purchase and leaving, Bell
and his companions returned with a rifle and three shotguns to rob
the station. The attendant, Danny Haden, was relieved of his money,
ordered into the car, searched, and forced to give up other personal
items. After a short drive, the driver stopped the car in a wooded area
and ordered the attendant to get out. Bell and two of the accomplices
took Haden into the woods. There he was decapitated by a shotgun
blast to the neck and shot in the back by another gun. These facts
were uncontradicted; however, there was conflicting testimony as to
who actually fired the shots that murdered Haden.'
Bell was indicted for capital murder pursuant to section
97-3-19(2)(e) of the 1972 Mississippi Code as amended in 1974 and
received a bifurcated trial in the Circuit Court of Forrest County3
under the standards announced by the Mississippi Supreme Court in
Jackson v. State.4 The jury found Bell guilty of capital murder, and
following a separate hearing for sentencing, returned a written ver-
dict imposing the death penalty.' The Mississippi Supreme Court
'Bell v. State, 360 So. 2d 1206, 1208 (Miss. 1978).
Bell's account of Haden's murder was contradicted by a former co-defendant and a
former cell mate. Bell's co-defendant testified that Bell told him that he had shot Haden
in the back. This testimony was supported by Bell's cell mate who testified that Bell ad-
mitted that he shot Haden again as he fell. However, Bell testified that on the June night
in question one of his companions "[blew Haden's] head off," and the other companion
shot Haden in the back. Id.
2
MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(2)(e)(Supp. 1978).
The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in
any manner shall be capital murder in the following cases:
(e) When done with or without any design to effect death, by any person en-
gaged in the commission of the crime of rape, burglary, kidnapping, arson, or
robbery, or in any attempt to commit such felonies.
'360 So. 2d at 1207.
'337 So. 2d 1242 (Miss. 1976). The murder occurred in June 1976 and Bell was in-
dicted in the March 1977 Forrest County Grand Jury Term. On April 13, 1977, the
Mississippi Legislature adopted new statutory procedures for trying capital murder
cases, MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1978), which calls for separate guilt and
sentencing phases in a bifurcated trial. Bell therefore, was tried under the 1972
Mississippi Code, as construed by Jackson v. State in October 1976.
The first case tried and reviewed in accordance with the new capital murder statute
was Washington v. State, 361 So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1978) (which quotes Bell v. State).
'360 So. 2d at 1208.
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reviewed the trial court's actions in accordance with the guidelines of
Jackson v. State' and, in a five to four decision, affirmed the holding
below. The court, on its own motion, noticed possible errors in two
different jury instructions, but the majority found that the problem
constituted mere harmless error.7
While reviewing Bell's circuit court trial, the supreme court
followed Jackson v. State,8 which brought Mississippi's 1972 capital
murder statute" into conformity with the United States Supreme
Court decisions of Gregg v. Georgia," Jurek v. Texas, Proffit v.
Florida," Woodson v. North Carolina,3 and Roberts v. Louisiana."
The court noted that Bell had been allowed a bifurcated trial with
separate guilt finding and sentencing phases. A majority found that
collectively the trial testimony was sufficient for the jury to find that
Bell was guilty of capital murder.' No irregularities were found by
the court with the sentencing phase of the trial.
The court weighed the mitigating circumstances against the ag-
gravating ones involved in the crime. According to the trial record
Bell was under the influence of marijuana and other drugs on the
night of the killing. Bell had also testified that he was only an ac-
complice and had asked one of his companions not to kill Haden. At
trial, Bell's co-defendant admitted that during the course of the eve-
ning, Bell requested that Haden not be killed. The court observed that
the trial record revealed the additional mitigating circumstance that
on the night of the crime Bell was still a youth. When the trial com-
menced he was only twenty years of age.'I
After reviewing the mitigating circumstances the court considered
'337 So. 2d 1242, 1255-56 (Miss. 1976). See also note 4, supra.
In two of his assignments of error, Bell contended that it was unconstitutional and a
violation of both separation of powers and the prohibition against ex post facto laws to
try him under the standards announced in Jackson v. State which was decided after
Bell's alleged criminal act. Both of these issues were heard and resolved against Bell in
an earlier appeal for a previous homicide conviction, Bell v. State, 353 So. 2d 1141,
1143 (Miss. 1977). See also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977).
'360 So. 2d 1215.
As part of his assignments of error, Bell alleged that the indictment was erroneous
and should have been quashed; and that his petition for psychiatric examination prior
to trial, and his motion to suppress certain pre-trial statements should have been
granted. The court reviewed all three of these issues and found that they all had been
decided correctly at trial. Id. at 1208-Il.
'337 So. 2d 1242 (Miss. 1976).
'MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(2)(e)(Supp. 1978).
10428 U.S. 153 (1976).
"428 U.S. 262 (1976).
12428 U.S. 242 (1976).
13428 U.S. 280 (1976).
'428 U.S. 325 (1976).
"360 So. 2d at 1211-12.
" d. at 1212.
[Vol.l: 189
CAPITAL MURDER
all aggravating factors. Evidence in the trial record showed that this
killing was committed in conjunction with an armed robbery and kid-
napping. The court noticed additional aggravating circumstances.
Bell had a long line of convictions of violent crimes. The murder of
Danny Haden occurred while committing a crime for pecuniary gain.
The execution-style killing was committed in an especially heinous
manner. After weighing these various factors the court found that the
jury was justified in rendering the death penalty at the sentencing
phase of the trial. I
Since the Mississippi Supreme Court has not affirmed any death
sentences since 1964, the court compared the result of this case with
thirty-one cases involving executions actually carried out from March
1955 through March 1964. After reviewing these prior cases, the
court found that a penalty of death would not be wanton or arbitrary
in Bell's situation. However, since these earlier cases were decided
before the present guidelines were established, the court elected to test
Bell's sentence with legislative intent and with similar cases from
other jurisdictions. The court found that the legislature, by statute,
had narrowed the list of crimes which could be punished by death.' 8 It
was also noted by the court that other jurisdictions have recently
reviewed similar cases and have approved the death penalty.' Thus,
the court held that the death penalty in Bell's instance was not
disproportionate to the crime committed.
2 0
Although not argued as error by the appellant, the supreme court
noticed two problem areas regarding the jury instructions which were
read to the jury by the trial judge.2 ' The first problem involved the
proper construction to be given to a charge regarding murder com-
mitted during the commission of another felony. The trial court sub-
mitted a poorly worded instruction that if the jury found that "the
defendant was engaged in the criminal act of armed robbery or kid-
'"360 So. 2d at 1212-14.
"Id. at 1214. The court was referring to Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(2) (Supp.




The court also judicially noticed two other minor problems in the trial record. The
record did not reveal that the jury had been specifically sworn in accordance with Miss.
CODE ANN. § 13-5-73 (Supp. 1978)which is required for death penalty cases. The court
found that the rebuttable presumption, that the trial judge had properly carried out his
duties, had not been overcome. See generally Thomas v. State, 298 So. 2d 690 (Miss.
1974) (court found harmless error which did not merit reversal); Hill v. State, 112 Miss.
375, 73 So. 66 (1916) (defendant to have waived statutory provision where no objection
is made until a verdict is rendered against him). But see Miller v. State, 112 Miss. 19, 84
So. 161 (1920) (court found that defendant was tried by an "illegal" jury).
The record also failed to show that the defendant was present in the courtroom
throughout the trial. The presumption, however, is to the contrary. 360 So. 2d at
1215.
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napping" 2 it should find the defendant guilty of capital murder. 21 In
other words, this improper instruction charged the jury that they
could convict Bell of capital murder if they were convinced he had
participated in the armed robbery or kidnapping. A properly worded
instruction which was submitted by the state charged the jurors that if
they found that Bell "willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and of his
malice aforethought [did] kill and murder Danny Haden, a human be-
ing, while in the commission of the crime of armed robbery and kid-
napping.. ." then they should find Bell guilty as charged . 2  Both in-
structions were read to the jury but the properly worded instruction
did not call attention to the poorly worded one. The majority of the
justices found that although the instruction submitted by the trial
court was improperly drawn, if read in context with the state's in-
struction, together with all of the other instructions as a whole, the
jury could not have been misled.
2S
The second problem involved a jury instruction which has often
been labeled the "do not have to know" instruction. This instruction
submitted by the State told the jury that "you do not have to know
that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged..." in order to con-
vict him.26 This confusing instruction explained that the law requires
that the jury "must believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable
doubt and to the exclusion .. ."27 of any other explanation that the
defendant is guilty. The majority admitted that the Mississippi
Supreme Court has held the "do not have to know" instruction to be
reversible error in numerous earlier criminal cases. They found,
however, that in these earlier cases the convictions were based upon
either circumstantial evidence or predominantly circumstantial
evidence. This was not the situation here, since Bell himself testified
and made admissions which clearly connected him to the victim's
death. Therefore, the majority of the justices found that, beyond a
reasonable doubt, these errors did not adversely affect the outcome of
the proceedings and that Bell did receive a fair trial.
2 8
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Broom contended that
although a defendant is not entitled to a perfect trial, he should be
allowed a trial free from "substantial or serious error" before being
put to death.20 Justice Broom argued that the first questionable jury
instruction authorized a murder conviction "for merely engaging in
2360 So. 2d at 1216-17 (Broom, J., dissenting).
2'Id. at 1217; Trial Record at 705 (Jury Instruction No. C-8).
"Trial Record at 707 (Jury Instruction No. S-I).
2360 So. 2d at 1215.
"Id. at 1217.
"Trial Record at 710 (Jury Instruction No. S-4).




either of two other offenses [armed robbery or kidnapping] and is
reversible error.' '30
A similar problem involving jury instructions is authorizing a jury
to convict a defendant of one crime because the jury finds that he has
engaged in another crime. Such an instruction was condemned as
reversible error by the court in a 1941 criminal case.
3
1
Justice Broom agreed with the majority that the "do not have to
know" instruction had previously been ruled to be reversible error,
and he admonished the majority for attempting to differentiate this
instruction's use "according to whether the evidence is 'circumstan-
tial or predominantly' so."32 He completely disagreed with the ma-
jority that "beyond a reasonable doubt" the jury would have reached
the same verdict without the faulty instructions. Justice Broom stated
that "the admittedly erroneous instructions are now in effect ap-
proved on the basis of a subjective standard, [that is, the] opinion of
the [majority] justices that the jurors were not influenced by faulty in-
structions. '"' Finally, the dissent pointed out that the erroneous in-
structions were not corrected by any other instruction which directed
the jurors' attention to the faulty instruction."
The Mississippi Supreme Court, in a long line of cases, has held the
"do not have to know" jury instruction to be reversible error.35 In
only three of the seven cases reported did the trial jury's verdict rest
on circumstantial evidence,36 and in none of these cases did the court
specifically state that it ruled the way it did because the verdicts
turned on circumstantial evidence.
3 7
In 1972 in the landmark case of Furman v. Georgia,38 the United
States Supreme Court held that the death penalty as then ad-
ministered in most jurisdictions was unconstitutional. The justices,
'2Id. at 1217.
"Cutshall v. State, 191 Miss. 764, 770-72, 4 So. 2d 289, 292 (1941) (cited in Bell v.
State, 360 So. 2d at 1217). Cutshall v. State held that although the jury, after receiving
proper instructions from the judge, could have found that defendant's actions con-
stituted gross negligence, the misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated does not con-
stitute manslaughter.
32360 So. 2d at 1217.
33/d.
3'Id. at 1218.
3 Kidd v. State, 258 So. 2d 423, 428 (Miss. 1972); Gilleylen v. State, 255 So. 2d 661,
664 (Miss. 1971); Kent v. State, 241 So. 2d 657, 660 (Miss. 1970); Nobles v. State, 241
So. 2d 826, 827-28 (Miss. 1970); Spencer v. State, 240 So. 2d 260, 263 (Miss. 1970);
Pryor v. State, 239 So. 2d 911, 912 (Miss. 1970) (cited in Bell v. State, 360 So. 2d at
1217) (none of these cases, however, involved the death penalty). cf. McGill v. State,
235 So. 2d 451, 452 (Miss. 1970) (The instruction itself was not held to be reversible er-
ror; however, it might constitute reversible error in a close case).
"Gilleylen v. State, 255 So. 2d 661,664 (Miss. 1971); Kent v. State, 241 So. 2d 657,
660 (Miss. 1970); Pryor v. State, 239 So. 2d 911, 912 (Miss. 1970).
"See note 35, supra. See also Bell v. State, 360 So. 2d at 1217 (Broom, J. dissenting).
3"408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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writing separate opinions for the majority,9 held generally that the
arbitrary infliction of the death penalty violated the eighth amend-
ment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment 0 as applied
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.' After Furman, later Supreme Court decisions have given
guidance to state courts and legislatures as to what procedures would
be acceptable in determining the death penalty.4 '2 The Court firmly
established in Gregg v. Georgia 3 that the death penalty is not un-
constitutional per se. Since the death penalty is such an unique and ir-
reversible punishment, suitable only to the most extreme crimes, the
focus following Furman has been on the procedure through which the
penalty is administered.4 In 1976, the Mississippi Supreme Court in
Jackson v. State4 S construed the state's capital murder statute to con-
form to the recent guidelines furnished by the United States Supreme
Court.
A well written capital murder statute does not necessarily
guarantee that a defendant's constitutional rights will be protected.
The statute must not only be properly administered, but basic con-
stitutional due process must be accorded.40 In Gardner v. Florida,"7
the United States Supreme Court held generally that although Florida
has a well constructed capital murder statute, the Florida Supreme
Court violated the defendant's basic due process rights by not proper-
ly applying the statute. In Gardner, the trial judge used a confidential
pre-sentencing report and sentenced the defendant to death, ignoring
the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court
held that the judge had violated the defendant's due process rights
even though the Florida statute allowed the judge to decide the
sentence after receiving a recommendation from the jury. Gardner
stands for the proposition that although a specific capital murder
3'Id. at 240, 257, 306, 310, 314.
"*U. S. CONST. amend. VIII, which states that "'fclruel and unusual punishment (shall
not be] inflicted."
41U. S. CONST. amend. XIV.
"Gregg v. Georiga, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Prof-
fitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
4"428 U.S. 153, 186, 187 (1976).
"Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 162-68, 187 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
276 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258-60 (1976); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 287,303-05 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333-36
(1976).
See also Davis, The Death Penalty and the Current Status of the Law, 14 CRIMINAL
LAW BULLETIN 7, 7-8 (1978); van de Haag, In Defense of the Death Penalty: A Legal-
Practical-Moral Analysis, 14 CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN 51, 54 (1978) 8 MEMPHIS ST. U. L.
REVIEW 107 (1977).
"337 So. 2d 1242 (Miss. 1976). See notes 4, 6, 8 supra.
"1U. S. CONST. amend. V, which states that "[no person shall be... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.
"430 U.S. 349 (1977).
[Vol. 1 : 189
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statute, on its face, avoids the constitutional deficiencies identified in
Furman, it can still be misapplied through substantial error in due
process." s
Even before the death penalty decisions of the seventies, the United
States Supreme Court held in Chapman v. California" "that before a
federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be
able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt."5 Likewise, long ago the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled
that "[c]onstitutional rights in serious criminal cases rise above mere
rules of procedure .... Besides, no person can be deprived of his liber-
ty except by due process of law."'"
When confronting the question, in a criminal case, whether faulty
jury instructions can be cured by other instructions or constitute
reversible error, a majority of jurisdictions recognize that they can be
cured. The general rule is that an error in one instruction is cured by
another when the instructions considered as a whole correctly state
the law. Only in this instance will the error not be reversible. The
Mississippi Supreme Court has long subscribed to this rule."3 This
general rule provides the standard by which the court can determine
if the requirements have been met. The Mississippi Supreme Court 4
and courts of several other jurisdictions s have stated that the re-
quirements of this test are not met when a correct instruction does not
cure or correct a faulty one, but contradicts it. The Supreme Court of
Hawaii has gone so far as to hold that a faulty instruction cannot be
cured by a correct instruction if the proper instruction does not call
"Id. See note 46 supra.
"386 U.S. 18 (1967).
"Id. at 24. In Chapman both defendants were convicted for robbery, kidnapping,
and murder. One defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment and the other to death.
Both the state prosecutor's argument and the trial judge's instruction commented on the
defendants' failure to take the stand. On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court held that
the state failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that such comments and in-
structions did not contribute to the defendants' convictions.
"Brooks v. State, 209 Miss. 150, 155, 46 So. 2d 94, 97 (1950) (quoting Miss. CONST.
art. 3 § 14).
"See e.g. Howard v. United States, 389 F.2d 287 (U.S. App. D.C. 1967); Johnson v.
State, 252 So. 2d 663, 664 (Miss. 1977); Odom v. State, 311 So. 2d 454, 456 (Miss.
1975); Alexander v. State, 250 So. 2d 629, 632 (Miss. 1971); Wilson v. State, 234 So. 2d
303, 309 (Miss. 1970); State v. Swift, 290 N. C. 383, 226 S.E.2d 652,664 (1976); Love-
day v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 503, 247 N.W. 2d 116, 125 (1976).
"Moon v. State, 1976 Miss. 72, 168 So. 476 (1936). See also note 52, supra.
"McMullen v. State, 291 So. 2d 537, 541 (Miss. 1974) (murder conviction,
reversed); Butler v. State, 177 Miss. 91,95, 170 So. 148, 149 (1936) (manslaughter con-
viction, reversed).
"State v. Dammons, 293 N. C. 263, 237 S.E.2d 834, 841 (1977); Barnes v. State,
348 So. 2d 599, 601 (Fla. App. 1977) (Manslaughter conviction); People v. Jenkins, 69
Ill. 2d 61, 370 N.E. 2d 532, 534 (1977) (attempted murder and aggravated battery).
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the jury's attention to the erroneous one. 6 The Mississippi Supreme
Court reached a similar conclusion in McHale v. Daniel.
5 7
When analyzing the opinion in the instant case, one must
remember that it is not a civil case, or even an ordinary criminal case,
but a decision pronouncing the death penalty. Since Furman the
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the irrevocabili-
ty and irreversability of the death penalty and the need to provide suf-
ficient protection to the defendant in such cases.5 8 Although a defen-
dant in a capital murder trial cannot be guaranteed a perfect trial, he
should be allowed a trial "free from any substantial or serious
error"5 " before being sentenced to death. Upon review the emphasis
of the court is whether any errors at trial were serious, substantial or
harmless. The test furnished in Chapman v. California60 for deciding
this issue is not that the appellate court declares a belief that any error
was harmless, but that "the court must be able to declare' ' 6 beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendant's
conviction. In the Bell case a majority of the justices found that,
beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict would not have been different
without the two faulty jury instructions and that Bell did in fact
receive a fair trial. 2 The dissent strongly disagreed, 3 therefore the
issue is whether the majority could have "been able to" find that the
faulty instructions did not contribute to Bell's conviction.
The first questionable jury instruction directed the jurors to find
Bell guilty of capital murder if they found that he "engaged in the
criminal act of armed robbery or kidnapping."6 The majority ad-
mitted that this instruction was improperly drawn but could not have
misled the jury when read in conjunction with the other
instructions. 5 The dissent challenged this erroneous instruction as
reversible error. Evidently the majority applied the general rule that
"State v. Napeahi, 57 Haw. 365, 556 P.2d 569, 577 (1976).
"233 So. 2d 764, 768 (Miss. 1970) (cited in Bell v. State, 360 So. 2d at 1218). In
McHale v. Daniel the court ruled that a faulty instruction on a material issue is not
cured by a proper instruction on the same issue. Although McHale is a civil case, the
reasoning is applicable to all situations civil or criminal: contradictory, self-contained
jury instructions can be materially confusing to the jury. If a court is willing to find
such contradictory instructions reversible error in a civil trial, it certainly should find
reversible error in a criminal trial where conviction carries a sentence with the finality
of the death penalty.
"See notes, supra.
"360 So. 2d at 1216 (Broom, J., dissenting).
"386 U.S. 18 (1967). See note 50, supra.
"Id. at 24.
62360 So. 2d at 1215.
"Id. at 1217, 1218.
"Id. at 1216-17 (Broom, J., dissenting). Apparently, the trial judge was attempting
to charge the jury regarding the felony-murder doctrine. However, as indicated in the




all jury instructions must be considered together, and when any errors
are cured or corrected by other instructions, the jury will not be con-
fused. However, the problem in this case is that the erroneous instruc-
tion was complete, in and of itself, and the proper instruction, also
complete, did not call attention to the erroneous one. The proper in-
struction did not really cure or correct the faulty one, but actually
contradicted it. On that ground the dissenting justices concluded that
the jury had not been given proper guidance.6
The guideline furnished by McHale v. Daniel"7 supported the
dissenting justices. Even though McHale involved litigation on a civil
issue, an analagous argument can be made on behalf of a defendant in
a criminal proceeding, especially a proceeding involving the death
penalty." This case fully supported Justice Broom's belief that the
jury's improper guidance constituted reversible error." As the dissent
points out, the majority invoked a subjective standard; that is, "how
much attention the [majority] justices think the jurors paid to [the]
faulty jury instruction."70 Under such circumstances the dissenting
justice concluded that Bell should be tried by another jury which has
been properly charged.7" The Chapman test yields a subjective stand-
ard when applied to the issue of jury instructions. A reviewing court
will never be able to objectively declare harmless error beyond a
reasonable doubt when attempting to decide what jurors might have
thought. Since the court decided this issue en banc and reached a five
to four decision, perhaps the majority should prevail. Admittedly the
scales of justice could tip either way on this issue. Perhaps a more
judicious decision would be to allow another jury, properly in-
structed, to decide the case, especially in one involving the death
penalty.
The second faulty jury instruction does not present such a close
question. The use of the "do not have to know" jury instruction has
been previously condemned in Mississippi.72 The majority swept
aside the court's earlier rulings condemning this instruction by find-
ing that the earlier decisions turned mostly on circumstantial
evidence.7 3 The dissenting justices claim that if the use of this instruc-
tion amounted to reversible error in non-death penalty cases, it should
certainly be reversible error for death penalty cases.7" Earlier cases
which condemned this instruction did not state that the instruction
"Id. at 1217.
"7233 So. 2d 764, 768-69 (Miss. 1970). See note 57 and accompanying textual
material, supra.
"See notes 44, 58, supra.
"See note 66, supra.
7360 So. 2d at 1218.
7 'Id. at 1218 (Broom, J., dissenting).
"See note 35, supra.
" 360 So. 2d at 1215.
"Id. at 1217-18.
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was erroneous because the decisions turned on circumstantial
evidence.7" The court's apparent decision to limit their earlier con-
demnation of the "do not have to know" instruction to decisions
which turn on circumstantial evidence could have been announced in
a case where conviction results in a penalty which is less final and less
controversial. Justice Broom, in the dissenting opinion, offers the
more judicially correct conclusion: "In a case where criminal convic-
tion carries with it the death penalty, the requirements of due process
include jury instructions not previously held to be reversible error." 6
In the instant case the majority of the justices on the supreme court
focused so intently upon the proper application of the guidelines an-
nounced in Jackson v. State that they overlooked customary due pro-
cess considerations. The minority justices seem to have reached the
more judicious conclusion. In a death penalty trial, the trial court
should not give contradictory jury instructions regarding one issue
which can be confusing to the jurors. The different instructions
which are potentially contradictory should call attention to each
other so that the jury can understand and consider them as a whole.
The trial court should not have used the questionable "do not have to
know" instruction which has been previously condemned by the
state's supreme court.
The holding in this case poses some unanswered questions which
can lead to confusing results in future cases. Has the court used this
case as a vehicle to state that the "do not have to know" instruction
may be used in future capital murder cases so long as the evidence is
predominantly circumstantial? If so, who decides what predominant-
ly circumstantial means? Has the court decided that the standard to
be applied to contradictory jury instructions will be the subjective
standard of whether upon review the majority justices think the jurors
were confused? Such a decision is contrary to the very nature of the
death penalty decisions since Furman which call for the fact finder to
determine the question of the death sentence as objectively as possible
after considering all relevant factors.
Statutory and case law guidelines for the proper adjudication and
administration of capital murder trials do not guarantee a proper
resolution if the trial court, when applying those guidelines, violates
the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial. While working
within the framework mandated for capital cases, the trial court must
continue to observe the requirements of due process in such areas as
presentation of evidence, arguments by counsel, and jury instructions.
Upon review, an appellate court should not focus on proper applica-
tion and adminstration of capital murder guidelines to the exclusion
of the defendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial through proper
"See note 35, supra. See also Bell v. State, 360 So. 2d at 1217.
"360 So. 2d at 1218.
[Vol. 1 : 189
1979] CAPITAL MURDER 199
due process. 7 "Constitutional rights in serious criminal cases rise
above mere rules of procedure." '
Michael T. McCollum
7 See generally Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), Brooks v. State, 209 Miss.
150, 46 So. 2d 94 (1950).
78Brooks v. State, 209 Miss. 150, 155, 46 So. 2d 94, 97 (1950). See also note 51,
supra.

